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Abstract
This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power
beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF)
energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply before establishing its secure com-
munication. We exploit a novel and practical scenario that the PBs and the transmitter may belong to different
operators and a hierarchical energy interaction between the PBs and the transmitter is considered. Specifically, the
monetary incentives are required for the PBs to assist the transmitter for secure communications. This leads to
the formulation of a Stackelberg game for the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where
the transmitter and the PB are modelled as leader and follower, respectively, each maximizing their own utility
function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game is then derived where we study various
scenarios of eavesdroppers and legitimate users that can have impact on the optimality of the derived solutions.
Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes.
Index Terms
Wireless powered communication networks (WPCN), Physical layer security, SWIPT, Multicasting, Stackelberg
game
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multicast media streaming is anticipated to be a significant component of the forthcoming
5G systems, motivated by the consumers’ desire to take advantage of high quality multimedia wireless
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devices (e.g., 4k hand-held devices, 3D augmented reality) [1]–[3]. Energy efficiency and security are
major critical issues that must be addressed in the design of such systems.
Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transfer techniques have recently been considered as a
promising solution to the energy-constrained wireless networks [4]–[6]. As a recent application of RF
energy harvesting and transfer techniques, wireless powered communication networks (WPCNs) have
become a novel technology in wireless networking and attracted more and more attention [7]. A “harvest-
then-transmit” protocol was proposed for WPCNs in [8], where the wireless users harvest power from the
RF signals broadcast by an access point in the downlink (DL), and then send information to the AP in
the uplink (UL) by employing the harvested energy. Cooperative protocols for WPCNs were developed
based on different models [9]–[11]. In [12], an intermediate self-sustainable relay was employed to enable
cooperation between a wireless energy transfer (WET) network and a wireless information transfer (WIT)
network to guarantee secure communications subject to outage probability constraints. A different approach
consists of deploying a dedicated WET network with multiple power beacons (PBs) to provide wireless
charging services to the wireless terminals via the RF energy transfer technique [13], [14]. Since the
PBs do not require any backhaul link, the associated cost of PBs deployment is much lower, hence, it
is feasible to deploy the PBs densely to guarantee network coverage for a wide range of mobile devices
[15].
Security in data transmission can be addressed either by traditional crypto methods, or more fun-
damentally, in terms of information theoretic secure rates. The latter approach, commonly referred to
as “physical-layer security,” was initially developed for the wiretap channel [16], [17], i.e., a broadcast
channel with one transmitter and two sets of receivers: legitimate users and eavesdroppers. Multiantenna
wiretap channels have been widely investigated in terms of secure rate region [18]–[22]. Some state-of-art
techniques, such as artificial noise (AN) and cooperative jammer (CJ), have been designed for multiantenna
transceivers, in order to introduce more interference at the eavesdroppers [23]–[30]. In [23], rank-one
solution properties were exploited with semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation for secure transmit
beamforming. AN-assisted transmit optimization has been presented in [24], where the spatially selective
AN embedded with secure transmit beamforming was designed to obtain the optimal power allocation.
In [25], CJ from an external node is exploited in order to create interference at the eavesdroppers and
achieve the desired target secure rate. However, it is not always possible to have an own CJ to improve
the secrecy rates. Another option could be to employ a private CJ by paying a price for the jamming
services. This strategy was investigated in [25], [26], where a CJ releases its jamming service depending
interference caused to the eavesdropper, while the transmitter pays a certain amount to guarantee its
secure communication. In this strategy, a Stackelberg game can be formulated to obtain the optimal power
allocation. In addition, cooperative cognitive radio (CR) combined with secure communications could
also be modelled as a Stackelberg game to determine the optimal resource allocations [27]. In [28]–[30],
the secrecy rate optimization problem was posed in terms of outage secrecy rates, due to the fact that
the channels are not perfectly known and are subject to random fading with known statistics. Physical-
layer security techniques have also been recently developed in radio frequency identification (RFID). The
design of RFID systems is a challenge due to the broadcast nature of backscatter communication, which
is vulnerable to eavesdropping [31]. Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) has
emerged as one of most promising approaches to provide power for communication devices. SWIPT has
been considered in combination with physical-layer security in a number of recent works (e.g., [32]–[35]).
It is worth pointing out that the transmit power is constant in the above secure communication systems.
However, the use of WET effectively makes the available transmit power a system variable in order to
achieve secure communications. Thus, this research gap motivates the work in this paper.
We investigate a WPCN-assisted multiantenna secure multicasting system, in which a multicast service
provider (i.e., the transmitter) guarantees secure communication with legitimate users in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers by utilizing the harvested energy from the PBs that are deployed by different
service operators. We exploit this energy interaction between the PBs and transmitter and formulate this
for the considered PB-assisted secure WPCN as a game theory framework. The contributions of this paper
are highlighted as follows:
1) Game theory based WPCN-aided multiantenna secure multicasting system: We investigate a scenario
where the PBs and the transmitter belong to different service operators, both of which want to
maximize their own benefit. Thus, incentives are required for the PBs to assist the transmitter to
guarantee the secure multicasting communications, which is known as ‘energy trading’. Particularly,
an energy price must be paid by the transmitter in order to induce the PBs to provide sufficient
energy. We develop an energy trading framework for the wireless powered secure multiantenna
multicasting systems, where the strategic behavior of the transmitter and the PBs is modeled as a
Stackelberg game. The transmitter acts as a leader that buys energy service from the PBs, which
optimizes the energy price and the energy transfer time to maximize its utility function, defined as
the weighted difference between revenues (proportional to the achievable secrecy rate) and costs
of the purchased energy. The PBs are the followers that determine their optimal transmit powers
based on the energy price offered by the transmitter to maximize their own profits, defined as the
difference between the payment received from the transmitter and their energy production cost.
We derive a closed-form solution for the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which both the PBs and the
transmitter come to an agreement on the energy price, transmit power and energy time allocation.
2) Conic Convex Reformulation: In the formulated Stackelberg game, the multicasting transmit beam-
forming vector leads to the nonconvexity of the leader game. To circumvent this issue, we propose a
conic convex reformulation to solve the optimal multicasting transmit beamforming vector directly.
We first propose a novel reformulation based on matrix transformations and convex conic opti-
mization techniques, yielding a second-order cone programming (SOCP) solution which is optimal
when the SDP relaxed solution satisfies the rank-one conditions. In addition, a special case with
single legitimate user and eavesdropper is investigated, where we derive a closed-form optimal
solution based on the dual problem and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Then, we propose
a successive convex approximation (SCA) based SOCP scheme, which is performed iteratively to
obtain the optimal transmit beamformer directly for any general case. Numerical results confirm
that our proposed SCA based SOCP scheme outperforms the SDP randomization scheme.
This paper differs from the related works in [8], [14], [23], [36]–[39] in terms of problem formulation
and mathematical solutions as follows:
• Problem formulation: This paper investigates a secure WPCN multicasting system, while [36] con-
sidered a secure WPCN system with one legitimate user and one eavesdropper. Note that in the
existing literatures (e.g., [14], [36]), it was assumed that the dedicated PBs are deployed by the same
service operator with the existing WIT network. In this case, the network can provide both wireless
access and wireless charging services [8], [14], or support the secrecy communication by utilizing
the harvested energy [36]. However, in this paper, we take into account a practical and novel scenario
that both PBs and the communication transmitter belong to different service providers, each aims to
maximize their own utility. For this scenario, the conventional approaches addressing the security by
maximizing the secrecy rate [36] or secrecy outage probability [37] subject to transmit power budget
cannot be applied. In fact, in the proposed approach we use hierarchical energy interaction (i.e.,
energy trading) framework through Stackeberg game to address the security when multiple providers
operate in a competitive manner. This approach is novel and has not been treated in previous literature.
• Mathematical solutions: In [23], [36], semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation was employed
to relax both power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems for the case of single
legitimate user only. However, this approach will not always guarantee a rank-one solution when
extending to the case of multiple legitimate users. Therefore, the rank-one feasible solution for the
original beamforming problem can only be achieved via the rank reduction methods (i.e., random-
ization techniques [1]), with no optimality guarantee (see, e.g., [38], [39]). In this paper, we study
a more comprehensive scheme than its counterparts in [23], [38], [39] by covering both scenarios
of when the rank-one condition is satisfied and when it is not. In particular, we employ an SCA
based method which can be applied to the general case when the rank-one condition is not satisfied.
In this way, the transmit beamforming vector can be solved directly by using the SOCP, in which
the conventional SDP randomization solution would not be able to provide the optimal solution. In
addition, the proposed SOCP approach allows a closed-form solution to be achieved for the special
case of single legitimate user and single eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model. Section III
investigates the game theory based secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting system. Section IV provides
simulation results to validate the theoretical derivations. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
A. Notations
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·)T
and (·)H denote the transpose and conjugate transpose respectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a
matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables. %max(∗) represents the maximum eigenvalue,
whereas vmax(∗) denotes the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue. A  0 indicates that
A is a positive semidefinite matrix. ‖ ∗ ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector. I and (·)−1 denote the
identity matrix with appropriate size and the inverse of a matrix respectively. [x]+ represents max{x, 0}.
The notation Kn denotes the following generalized inequality: a
b
 Kn 0⇔ ‖b‖ ≤ a,
where a ∈ R+, b ∈ Cn−1 and Kn ⊆ Rn is a proper cone [41].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider the secure wireless powered multiantenna multicasting system as shown
in Fig. 1, where a transmitter broadcasts the same information to all legitimate users in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. It is assumed that the transmitter has not an exogenous energy source and must
harvest energy from a WET network, formed by multiple PBs. This system consists M single antenna
PBs, one multiantenna transmitter equipped with NT transmit antennas, K single antenna legitimate users
and L single antenna eavesdroppers. This secrecy model has some potential applications, such as wireless
sensor networks, device to device (D2D) communication systems, and on-demand video broadcasting. For
example, in recent works of femtocaching, D2D caching networks [42], [43], it is advocated that “helper”
nodes are densely disseminated in a coverage area and serve users’ demands using their own large cached
information. Cache memory at the helpers alleviates the need for a backhaul connection such that these
helper nodes can be placed arbitrarily, even if there is no high-speed data connection. In this case, we
always wish to make such helper nodes truly free from any wired connection, including power. Thus, they
need to harvest energy somewhere, for example, from a WET network. However, there arises a need for
secrecy projection as on-demand broadcasting normally requires a subscription, which means illegitimate
users will not be able to access the content that they do not pay for. In our paper, a harvest-then-transmit
protocol is considered. Specifically, time is divided in periods of duration T . Each period is split into a
WET phase of duration θT, and a WIT phase of duration (1−θ)T, where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a system parameter
that must be optimized. Let hs,k ∈ CNT×1 denote the channel coefficients between the transmitter and
the k-th legitimate user, while he,l ∈ CNT×1 denotes the channel coefficients between the transmitter and
the l-th eavesdropper. Also, gm ∈ C1×NT denotes the channel coefficients between the m-th PB and the
Fig. 1: WPCN for multiantenna secure multicasting system.
transmitter. First, each PB transfers the energy to the transmitter, the harvested energy during the WET
phase of θT at the transmitter can be written as
EB = ξ
M∑
m=1
pm‖gm‖2θT, (1)
where pm denotes the transmit power of the m-th PB, and 0 < ξ ≤ 1 is the efficiency for converting the
harvested energy to the electrical energy to be stored, which is assumed to be ξ = 1 in this paper. During
the WIT phase of (1− θ)T , the received signal at the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper are
given by
ys,k =
√
EB
(1− θ)T h
H
s,kvs+ ns,k, k = 1, ..., K,
ye,l =
√
EB
(1− θ)T h
H
e,lvs+ ne,l, l = 1, ..., L,
where s denotes the Gaussian distributed transmit signal with unit norm, v ∈ CNT×1 is the normalized
transmit beamformer with E{‖v‖2} = 1, ns,k and ne,l are additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at
the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper with variance σ2s and σ
2
e . Hence, the channel capacity
of the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper can be expressed as [36]
Rs,k = (1− θ) log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
)
, ∀k, (2)
and
Re,l = (1− θ) log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
)
, ∀l, (3)
respectively. For this secure multicasting system, we have the following definition:
Definition 1: Multicast secrecy rate of a multicasting system with K users is defined as [39]
RK = min
k∈[1,K]
[Rs,k − max
l∈[1,L]
Re,l]
+ = min
k∈[1,K]
(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
)
− max
l∈[1,L]
log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
)]+
. (4)
III. GAME THEORY BASED SECURE WPCN MULTIANTENNA MULTICASTING SYSTEM
In this section, we consider the scenario where the transmitter and the PBs are from two different
service providers. Both parties want to maximize their own benefit. To model this scenario, we assume
that the transmitter will have to pay for the energy services from the PBs, whereas the PBs will consider
this payment as incentives to provide wireless energy transfer service. Obviously, being able to decide
what price to pay for the energy service, the transmitter can take a leading role in dictating the energy
trading interaction. This fits very well the model of a Stackelberg game, which motivates us to use this
game theory to optimize both parties’ benefit. We assume that the channel state information (CSI) between
the transmitter and k-th user as well as l-th eavesdropper (i.e., hs,k, ∀k and he,l, ∀l) is available at the
transmitter. This can be achieved through different methods such as the local oscillator power leakage
from the eavesdropper receivers’ RF frontend [44] or even the CSI feedback method [45]. For example, in
a video broadcasting system there may be legitimate users that are entitled to receive the content and other
users who have not subscribed to this content, but are still part of the system. These users obey the basic
physical-layer protocol rules, which includes feeding back CSI to enable beamforming. Hence, in this
case, it is practical to assume that the CSI of the eavesdroppers is known at the transmitter. In this game
model, the transmitter (leader) first pays for the harvested energy with an energy price to maximize its
utility function. Then, the PBs (followers) optimize their transmit powers based on their released energy
price to maximize their individual utility function.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
Let λ denote the energy price that the transmitter will pay to the PBs. The total payment of the
transmitter to the M PBs, donoted by QM , is written as
QM = λθT
M∑
m=1
pm‖gm‖2, (5)
where pm denotes the transmit power of the mth PB. Without loss of generality, we can assume T = 1.
We now define the utility function of the transmitter as follows:
UM = µRK −QM , (6)
where µ > 0 is the weight per a unit of secrecy throughput, by which the transmitter uses to convert the
achievable secrecy rate RK into the equivalent revenue. Therefore, the leader game for the transmitter can
be formulated as
max
λ,θ,v
UM , s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0. (7)
At the same time, each PB can be modelled as a follower that wants to maximize its own revenue function,
which is defined as follows:
UPB,m = θ(λpm‖gm‖2 −Fm(pm)), (8)
where Fm(pm) is used to model the cost of the m-th PB per unit time for wirelessly charging the
transmitter with the transmit power pm. In this paper, we consider the following quadratic model1 for the
cost function of the PBs:
Fm(x) = Amx2 +Bmx (9)
where Am > 0 and Bm > 0 are the constants that can be different for each PB. Thus, the follower game
of m-th PB is given by
max
pm
UPB,m, s.t. pm ≥ 0. (10)
Both (7) and (10) form a Stackelberg game for this secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting system, where
the transmitter (leader) announces an energy price, and then the PBs (followers) optimize the transmit
1The quadratic model has been commonly used in the energy market to model the energy cost [46].
power based on the released energy price to maximize their individual revenue functions. The solution of
this Stackelberg game can be obtained by investigating the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the transmitter
and the PBs come to an agreement on the energy price, the transmit power of each PB and the time
fraction of energy transfer duration. Note that the deviation of either the transmitter or the PBs from the
Stackelberg equilibrium will introduce a loss in their revenue functions.
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium
In order to derive the solution of this game, the well-known Stackelberg equilibrium concept can be
defined as follows:
Definition 2: Let (θopt, λopt) denote the solutions of problem (7) while {poptm } represents the solution of
problem (10) (here, the brackets {} indicate a vector that include all pm’s with ∀m). Then, the triple-
variable set (θopt, λopt, poptm ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game provided that the following
conditions are satisfied
UM(θ
opt, λopt, {poptm }) ≥ UM(θ, λ, {poptm }), (11)
UPB,m(θ
opt, λopt, poptm ) ≥ UPB,m(θopt, λopt, pm), ∀m. (12)
for 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0, and pm ≥ 0, ∀m.
C. Solution of The Follower Game
First, it can be observed that problem (10) is convex with respect with pm for given values of λ and θ.
Thus, the solution of (10) is immediately obtained by setting the derivative w.r.t. pm to zero as follows:
poptm =

λ‖gm‖2−Bm
2Am
, λ > Bm‖gm‖2
0, λ ≤ Bm‖gm‖2 .
(13)
Based on (13), we can deduce the following remark:
Remark 1: From (13), it is observed that the optimal power allocation poptm can only be obtained (i.e.,
solution pm is positive) under the condition that the energy price λ is greater than threshold Bm‖gm‖2 . Thus,
in order to guarantee the sufficient energy harvested by the transmitter, we divide these PBs into two
sets, namely, the active PB set and the non-active PB set. The PBs who can transfer the energy to the
transmitter and help determine the achievable secrecy rate by using the harvested energy are called the
active PB set, who satisfies the first equation in (13). The remaining ones are the non-active PB set (i.e.,
their power poptm is zero). In our paper, we assume that from M available PBs there are M¯ active PBs
(M¯ ≤M ). Hereafter, we consider this set of active PBs only and re-index the mth PB to be one of this
set (i.e., m = 1, 2, · · · , M¯).
D. Solution of The Leader Game
By exploiting Remark 1, we replace pm in (7) with (13), so that problem (7) becomes
max
λ,θ,v
µ(1− θ)
[
min
k
log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
]
−max
l
log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
]]
− λθ
M¯∑
m=1
pm‖gm‖2
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0. (14)
The problem is not convex in terms of normalized transmit beamfoming vector v, the energy transfer
price λ, and the energy time allocation θ, which cannot be solved directly.
1) Solution for Transmit Beamforming Vector: Thus, for given λ and θ, we first achieve the optimal
solution for v by solving the following optimization problem:
max
v
min
k
log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
]
−max
l
log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
]
,
s.t. ‖v‖2 ≤ 1. (15)
Problem (15) is not convex due to its objective function. In order to circumvent this issue, we relax this
problem as
max
w,R
R,
s.t. log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHs,kw|2
(1− θ)σ2s
]
− log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHe,lw|2
(1− θ)σ2e
]
≥ R, ∀ (k, l),
‖w‖2 ≤ P, (16)
where w =
√
Pv, P =
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2. Problem (16) is still non-convex and, thus, is not likely to be
solved efficiently. To make the problem tractable, we first decompose (16) into a sequence of following
minimization problems, one for each target rate R > 0:
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t. log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHs,kw|2
(1− θ)σ2s
]
− log
[
1 +
θ(
∑M¯
m=1 p
opt
m ‖gm‖2)|hHe,lw|2
(1− θ)σ2e
]
≥ R, ∀ (k, l).
(17)
Problem (17) can be reformulated as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. log
(
1 +
|hHs,kw|2
σ¯2s
)
− log
(
1 +
|hHe,lw|2
σ¯2e
)
≥ R, ∀ (k, l), (18)
where σ¯2s =
(1−θ)σ2s
θ
, σ¯2e =
(1−θ)σ2e
θ
.
Algorithm 1: Bisection method
1) Choose ε > 0 (termination parameter), Rlb and Rub such that Ropt lies in [Rlb, Rub];
2) R = (Rlb +Rub)/2;
3) Check the feasibility of problem (18) with R. If infeasible, let Rub = R, and go to step 4; otherwise,
go to step 5.
4) Check ‖w‖2 ≤ P . If it is satisfied, set Rlb = R; otherwise, Rub = R;
5) Until Rub −Rlb ≤ ε; else go to step 2.
Obviously, the optimal objective value of the problem (17) is monotonically increasing with respect to
R. Thus, by solving problem (17) with different R and using a bisection search over R as described in
Algorithm 1, the optimal secrecy rate R and the associated normalized transmit beamforming vector v
can be obtained. Therefore, we will focus on solving (17) in the following.
The problem (18) is not convex in terms of w, and still cannot be solved efficiently. In order to
circumvent this non-convex issue, we introduce a new rank-one semidefinite matrix Qs = wwH . By
relaxing the rank-one constraint, we can arrive at the following convex relaxation:
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t.
1
σ2s
Tr(hs,khHs,kQs)−
2R
σ2e
Tr(he,lhHe,lQs) ≥ 2R − 1, ∀(k, l). (19)
The above problem is convex by dropping the non-convex constraint rank(Qs) = 1 and can be solved
by using interior-point methods [41]. It is not always possible to expect that the optimal solution of (19)
attains the optimum of the original problem (18). However, the SDP relaxation is tight if the optimal
solution of (19) has rank one. The rank of the solution of (19) is characterized by the following result:
Proposition 1: [38, Theorem 1] Provided the problem (19) is feasible, the optimal solution of (19)
must satisfy the following rank inequality:
rank(Qs) ≤ min(K,
√
KL) (20)
With Proposition 1, we are able to identify the tightness of SDP relaxed solution via the following lemma
Lemma 1: [38, Corollary 1] Provided the problem (19) feasible, it is guaranteed that (19) can yield a
rank-one solution which exactly solves the problem (18) when either one of the two following conditions
is satisfied:
1) K = 1 and L ≥ 1.
2) 1 < K ≤ 3, and L = 1.
By exploiting Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, if rank(Qs) satisfies the rank-one condition in Lemma 1, we
can employ the eigen-decomposition for Qs to obtain the optimal transmit beamformer w. Otherwise, we
need to use a rank reduction algorithm to tackle this problem [47]. However, when the rank-one condition
in Lemma 1 is satisfied, we can also consider the following theorem to directly solve the problem (18).
Theorem 1: The problem (18) can be reformulated as the following convex optimization when the
rank-one condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied.
min
t≥0,w
t,
s.t.
 t
w
 K(NT+1) 0,

1
σ¯s
wHhs,k
2
R
2
σ¯e
wHhe,l
(2R − 1) 12
 K3 0, ∀ (k, l). (21)
Proof: The proof can be obtained by using the generalized cone inequality
 a
b
 Kn 0⇔ ‖b‖ ≤ a.
By exploiting Theorem 1, it is verified that (21) is a convex optimization problem, which can be solved
by using interior-point methods [41]. Thus, the optimal normalized transmit beamforming vector vopt can
be easily achieved. Now, we consider the computation complexity of solving problem (21). According to
the analysis of the basic complexity elements in [48], problem (21) includes one second-order cone (SOC)
constraint with dimension NT + 1, KL SOC constraints with dimension NT , and one linear constraint.
Thus, its computation complexity can be given by O
(√
2KL+ 3n[KLN2T + (NT + 1)
2 + 1 +n2]
)
ln(1

),
where n = O(NT + 1), and  > 0 denotes the accuracy requirement.
A special case: Consider the case with a single legitimate user and a single eavesdropper only. The closed-
form solution can be derived by exploiting Lagrange dual problem and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions2. For notational convenience, we replace the channel notations hs,k and he,l by hs and he,
respectively. The following lemma is introduced:
Lemma 2: The optimal solution to (18) with only single legitimate user and single eavesdropper is
given by
wopt =
√
P optvopt, vopt =
w¯
‖w¯‖2 , w¯ = vmax(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ¯2e
heh
H
e ),
P opt = αopt(2R − 1), αopt = 1
%max(
1
σ¯2s
hshHs − 2Rσ¯2e hehHe )
. (22)
Proof: See Appendix A.
2For this special case, a related work in [49] aimed at maximizing the secrecy rate subject to a transmit power constraint, in which the
optimal beamforming vector is obtained based on Rayleigh quotient approach. Our work obtained a closed-form solution of the joint design
of the optimal time allocation and the optimal transmit beamforming vector via the dual problem and the KKT condition. Note that our
work can also be extended to the problem of minimization of the transmitter’s transmit power.
Now, a natural question is how to tackle problem (18) when the rank-one condition of Lemma 1 is not
satisfied. For this scenario, SDP relaxed method may result in poor performance or even fail to obtain the
optimal beamforming vector when SDP relaxed method returns high-rank solutions. This phenomenon is
very common in multicast scenario even without security constraint [1]. For this purpose, we consider
an SCA based scheme to reformulate the problem (18) for any general case, yielding an SOCP. We
equivalently rewrite the problem (18) by introducing a new set of variables (xs,k, ys,k, bs,k), ∀k as
min
w,bs,k
‖w‖2,
s.t. x2s,k + y
2
s,k ≥ bs,k, (23a)
(2R − 1)σ¯2s +
2Rσ¯2s
σ¯2e
|wHhe,l|2 ≤ bs,k, (23b)
xs,k = <
{
wHhs,k
}
, ys,k = =
{
wHhs,k
}
, (23c)
where (xs,k, ys,k, bs,k) ∈ R, ∀k In the above reformulation, it is observed that both constraint (23a) and
(23b) are still not convex while (23c) are linear constraints. In order to further process these non-convex
constraints, we first introduce iterative successive approximation methods to tackle (23a). Specifically,
set qs,k = [xs,k ys,k]T , and denote the value of this vector at the n-th iteration as q
(n)
s,k . We consider the
first-order Taylor series to approximate the left hand side of (23a) as
x2s,k + y
2
s,k = q
T
s,kqs,k ≈ ‖u(n)s,k‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
s,k (i)[qs,k(i)− u(n)s,k (i)], (24)
where the parameter vector u(n)s,k (i) can be updated u
(n+1)
s,k = q
(n)
s,k , ∀k at the (n + 1)-th iteration, and
qs,k(i) denotes the ith element of qs,k. It depends on the optimization variables obtained as a solution to
(23) at n-th iteration. Thus, (24) can be given by
‖u(n)s,k‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
s,k (i)[qs,k(i)− u(n)s,k (i)] ≥ bs,k. (25)
To proceed, the constraint (23b) can be equivalently reformulated into the following SOC constraint∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (2R − 1) 12 σ¯s
2
R
2 σ¯s
σ¯e
wHhe,l
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ bs,k ⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

(2R − 1) 12 σ¯s
2
R
2 σ¯s
σ¯e
wHhe,l
(bs,k−1)
2

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
(bs,k + 1)
2
. (26)
Remark 2: The convexity of the term qTs,kqs,k and the first-order Taylor approximation ensures that
the right hand side in (24) bounds the left side in each iterative procedure. In other words, the optimal
solution of the problem with the approximated constraint in (24) definitely belongs to the feasible set of
the original optimization problem at each iteration. Also, due to the above update, the approximation in
(24) holds with equality at the (n + 1)-th iteration. In addition, the gradients of both sides in (24) (i.e.,
left hand side x2s,k + y
2
s,k or q
T
s,kqs,k, and right hand side ‖u(n)s,k‖2 + 2
∑2
i=1 u
(n)
s,k (i)[qs,k(i)− u(n)s,k (i)]) with
respect to qs,k are the same at the (n + 1)-th iteration, which shows that this approximation algorithm
converges to a KKT point, and the solution of the iterative procedure satisfies the KKT conditions [50,
Theorem 1].
By exploiting Remark 2, the problem (18) takes the following form at the n-th iteration
min
w,bs,k
‖w‖2,
s.t. (25), (26), (23c), ∀(k, l). (27)
Based on the above discussion, an iterative algorithm to solve the problem in (18) is summarized in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Successive convex approximation to solve (18)
1) Initialization: Randomly generate u(0)s,k, ∀k to make (27) feasible
2) Repeat
a) Solve (27).
b) Set u(n+1)s,k = q
(n)
s,k , ∀k.
c) Set n := n+ 1.
3) Until required accuracy is achieved or the maximum number of iterations is reached.
From Algorithm 2, the initialized vector us,k is given by random generation to guarantee the feasibility
of (27), which can be updated at each iteration until u(n+1)s,k = q
(n)
s,k holds when the algorithm converges.
Now, we claim that Algorithm 2 is guaranteed to converge. The optimization variables w, xs,k and ys,k,
for all k belong to both S(n) and S(n+1), where S(n) is the feasible set of optimization problem at n-th
iteration. Therefore, f (n)S ≥ f (n+1)S , where f (n)S is the objective function at n-th iteration. Since the feasible
set of (27) is convex and compact, this iterative procedure converges to a locally optimum solution [40].
2) Solution for The Energy Price and Energy Time Allocation: In previous subsection, we exploit the
optimal solution for the transmit beamforming vector v. In this subsection, we solve for the optimal
solution to the energy price λ and the energy transfer time allocation θ only in leader level game (14) for
given v, which is written as
max
λ,θ
µ(1− θ)
[
min
k
log
[
1 +
(
λ
M¯∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
−
M¯∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
)
ts
]
−min
l
log
[
1 +
(
λ
M¯∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
−
M¯∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
)
te
]]
− θλ2
M¯∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
+ θλ
M¯∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0 (28)
where
ts = min
k
ts,k = min
k
θ|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
, ∀k, te = max
l
te,l = min
l
θ|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
, ∀l.
The problem (28) is not jointly convex in terms of θ and λ. It is extremely hard to find their optimal
solutions simultaneously due to the complexity of the objective function in (28). In order to address this
issue, we first derive the closed-form solution for the optimal λ with a given value θ. Then, the optimal
value for θ can be achieved through numerical analysis. In order to derive the closed-form solution of λ,
we set CM =
∑M¯
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
, DM =
∑M¯
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
4Am
, and the objective function to (14) can be expressed as
UM(θ, λ) = µ(1− θ)
[
log
[
1 +
(
λCM − 2DM
)
ts
]
− log
[
1 +
(
λCM − 2DM
)
te
]]
− θλ2CM + 2θλDM . (29)
Lemma 3: (29) is a concave function with respect to λ.
Proof: See Appendix B.
By exploiting Lemma 3, we can claim that (14) is a convex problem. Now, we derive the closed-form
solution of λ. In order to obtain the optimal solution to λ, let the first order derivative of (29) equate to
zero, we have
µ(1− θ)tsCM
1 + (λCM −DM)ts −DM ts −
µ(1− θ)teCM
1 + (λCM −DM)te −DM te − 2θCMλ+ 2θDM = 0. (30)
Set x = λCM −DM , and after a few of mathematical simplifications, we arrive at
x3 + ax2 + bx+ c = 0, (31)
where
a =
(ts + te)− 2DM tste
tste
, b =
(DM ts − 1)(DM te − 1)
tste
, c = −µ(1− θ)CM(ts − te).
It is easily observed that (31) is a cubic equation, which can be solved in terms of closed-form solution
of x by using Cardano’s formula [51],
xopt = ej∠x1 3
√
|x1|+ ej∠x2 3
√
|x2| − a/3, (32)
where ∠ denotes the phase angle of an complex random variable, and
x1 = −q
2
+
√
∆, x2 = −q
2
−
√
∆,
∆ =
p3
27
+
q2
4
, p = −a
2
3
+ b, q =
2a3
27
− ab
3
+ c.
Thus, we obtain the optimal energy price as
λopt =
xopt +DM
CM
. (33)
We have already obtained the optimal energy price of the transmitter for a given θ. Now, the optimal
energy transfer time allocation is derived in the following. We substitute the closed-form expression (33)
into (29), thus, the following optimization problem can be written with respect to θ,
max
θ
UM(θ, λ
opt) = µ(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
θ
1− θ t¯s
)
− log
(
1 +
θ
1− θ t¯e
)]
− θΨ,
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, (34)
where
t¯s =
Φ mink |hHs,kv|2
σ2s
, t¯e =
Φ maxl |hHe,lv|2
σ2e
,
Φ = λopt
M¯∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
−
M¯∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
, Ψ = (λopt)2
M¯∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
− λopt
M¯∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
. (35)
Now, we show that the problem (34) is a convex optimization problem with respect to θ for given v and
λopt via the following lemma:
Lemma 4: (34) is a convex problem with respect to θ.
Proof: See Appendix C.
By exploiting Lemma 4, the problem (34) can be efficiently handled by using 1D search to obtain the
optimal energy transfer time solution θopt as follows:
θopt = arg max
θ∈(0,1)
UM(θ, λ
opt). (36)
We have completed the derivation of the Stackelberg equilibrium (poptm , λ
opt, θopt) for the formulated
Stackelberg game, which are shown in (13), (32) and (36).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the simulation results to validate the proposed schemes. We consider the
secure multiantenna multicasting system that consists of three legitimate receivers (i.e., K = 3) and two
eavesdroppers (L = 5), where the transmitter is wirelessly powered by five PBs (M = 5). It is assumed
that the transmitter is equipped with eight transmit antennas (i.e., NT = 8), whereas the others consist of
single antenna. We employ the path loss channel model
√
Ad−αx [52], [53], where A = 10
−3. The path
loss exponent is set to α = 3. Distance variable dx can be replaced with ds, de, and dPB according to
different channel coefficients, representing the distance between the transmitter and the legitimate users,
the eavesdroppers as well as the PBs, respectively. In our simulation, we choose ds = de = 2 m, and
dPB = 5 m unless specified. The target secrecy rate is set to be R = 2 bps/Hz. The noise powers at the
legitimate users and the eavesdroppers are set as σ2s = σ
2
e = 10
−8 mW.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of transmit power between the proposed scheme and SDP scheme versus distance between PBs and
transmitter.
First, we evaluate the leader game and particularly problem (17) where we can achieve the minimized
transmit power against the distance between PBs and the transmitter (i.e., dPB). Fig. 2 shows the result in
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Fig. 3: Comparison of transmit power between the SOCP and SDP schemes versus distance between PBs and transmitter.
general case where the rank-one condition in Lemma 1 is not satisfied. One can observe that our proposed
SCA scheme slightly performs better than the SDP randomization scheme3 in [39]. This is owing to the fact
that our proposed scheme can achieve an optimal solution via Algorithm 2, whereas the relaxed solution
for the SDP randomization scheme may not achieve the optimality, which highlights the advantage of our
proposed SCA scheme. However, in the case of the rank-one condition being satisfied, Fig. 3 shows that
the SOCP yields the same performance as that of the proposed SCA scheme and the SDP scheme, which
validates the correctness of Theorem 1. Fig. 4 shows the impact of the energy time allocation. From this
figure, we observe that the proposed SOCP scheme with the fixed time allocation (i.e., θ = 0.5) obviously
requires more transmit power than the proposed SOCP scheme with optimal energy time allocation. This
is owing to a fact that our proposed scheme can achieve an optimal energy time allocation by numerical
search (i.e., θ = θopt). Similar behaviors are observed in Fig. 5 which is obtained for the special case of
single user and single eavesdropper. This figure shows that the derived closed-form solution in Lemma
2 matches well with the numerical results obtained from a convex optimization tool, which validates the
accuracy of this closed-form solution.
3Randomization techniques can be used to construct a rank-one solution to tackle the non rank-one SDP relaxed solution [1], which is a
feasible solution.
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Fig. 7: The utility function of transmitter UM versus energy transfer time allocation θ
Next, we validate the equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game. In order to support the derived
Stackelberg equilibrium, we first evaluate the utility function of the transmitter versus the energy transfer
price λ with a fixed energy transfer time allocation θ in Fig. 6. From this figure, it is observed that the
revenue function is concave, which validates the proof of convexity shown in Lemma 3. In this figure, it
also can be shown that the optimal utility function of the transmitter can be obtained via optimal energy
transfer price λopt in (33) and it matches the numerical search with different given θ, which confirms the
optimal closed-form solution of the energy transfer price λ. Also, as θ increases, the utility function of
the legitimate transmitter is decreasing, and the optimal value λ shifts to the left. In addition, the revenue
function of the transmitter versus energy transfer time allocation (i.e., θ) with optimal energy price λopt
is shown in Fig. 7. From this figure, it is shown that the revenue function is concave with respect to θ,
which validates (36). Moreover, there exists a optimal utility transfer time (i.e., θopt) via numerical search
with the optimal energy price. As µ increases, the optimal value slightly shifts to the left.
Then, we evaluate the transmitter revenue function performance of the proposed Stackelberg game.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the revenue function of the transmitter versus the number of PBs. From both
figures, we can observe that this utility is improved with increasing of the number of PBs and µ. From
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Fig. 8: The utility function of transmitter UM versus No. of PBs with different number of legitimate users and eavesdroppers
Fig. 8, increasing the number of the eavesdroppers can have more significant impact on the revenue
than increasing the number of the legitimate users. In Fig. 9, the revenue is decreased when the distance
between the source and PBs is increased from 5m to 6.5m. This is because the nearer the PBs to the
transmitter, the higher the transferred energy efficiency between them, which reduces the transmitter’s
payments to the PBs for their wireless energy services. Fig. 10 shows the optimal energy transfer time θ
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versus the number of PBs. It is observed that θ decreases as either the number of the PBs or µ increase.
The same behavior is observed when the distance between the source and PBs (i.e., dPB) decreases. Fig.
11 shows the optimal energy price versus the number of PBs. The price decreases as the number of PBs
increases. Besides, the larger µ, the higher optimal energy price needs to be paid. It can also be seen
from this figure that the decrease of the distance between the transmitter and PBs can also reduce the
optimal energy price. This is because the shorter the distance between the source and PBs, the more
energy harvested by the transmitter for the same power transmitted by the PBs, such that a lower energy
price can be paid by the transmitter.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed an energy interaction framework for the PBs-assisted secure wireless-
powered multiantenna multicasting system. Considering the strategic behaviours of the transmitter and
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Fig. 10: Optimal energy transfer time allocation θ versus No. of PBs
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Fig. 11: The optimal energy price versus No. of PBs.
the PBs, we formulated this energy interaction as a Stackelberg game for the considered network, where
the transmitter plays a leader role and pays a price for the energy services from the PBs to guarantee
the required security, and optimizes the energy price and the energy transfer time to maximize its utility
function. Meanwhile, the PBs are modelled as the followers that determine their optimal transmit powers
based on the released energy price to maximize their own utility function. In addition, conic convex
reformulation was proposed to achieve the optimal transmit beamforming vector for the leader game. The
Stackelberg equilibrium have been derived in terms of closed-form solution, where both the transmitter
and the PBs come to an agreement on the energy price, PB’s transmit power and energy transfer time.
Simulation results have been provided to validate the proposed schemes. For future works, we can consider
a more challenging scenario such that the PBs will not stay silent during the wireless information transfer
phase but rather transmit artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdroppers. This would change the dynamic
of the optimization problems and may require different design/solutions.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
The power minimization problem (18) with only single legitimate user and eavesdropper can be rewritten
as
min
w
wHw
s.t. log
(
1 +
|hHs w|2
σ¯2s
)
− log
(
1 +
|hHe w|2
σ¯2e
)
≥ R. (37)
Now we equivalently modify (37) as
min
v,P
PvHv
s.t.
vH(I + P
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s )v
vH(I + P
σ¯2e
hehHe )v
≥ 2R, vHv = 1, P ≥ 0. (38)
In order to achieve the optimal solution (P opt,vopt), we consider the Lagrange dual problem to (37), which
can be expressed as
L(w, α) = wHw + α
[
2R
(
1 +
1
σ¯2s
wHheh
H
e w
)
−
(
1 +
1
σ¯2e
wHhsh
H
s w
)]
, (39)
where α ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the secrecy rate constraint. The corresponding
dual problem can be given by
max
α≥0
α(2R − 1), s.t. Y = I− α
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
 0. (40)
To proceed, we consider the following problem:
min
Qs
Tr(Qs),
s.t.
1
σ2s
Tr(hshHs Qs)−
2R
σ2e
Tr(hehHe Qs) ≥ 2R − 1, (41a)
Qs  0. (41b)
We investigate the Lagrangian function of the problem (41) as follows:
L(Qs, α1,Z) = Tr(Qs) + α1
[
2R
σ2e
Tr(hehHe Qs)−
1
σ2s
Tr(hshHs Qs) + 2
R − 1
]
− Tr(QsZ)
= Tr
[(
I +
2Rα1
σ2e
heh
H
e −
α1
σ2s
hsh
H
s − Z
)
Qs
]
+ α1(2
R − 1), (42)
where α1 ≥ 0 and Z  0 are the dual variables associated with the constraints (41a) and (41b), respectively.
Thus, the dual problem can be expressed as
max
α1≥0
α1(2
R − 1),
s.t. Z = I− α1
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
 0. (43)
It can be easily observed that the dual problems of (40) and (43) are the same. Thus, we can claim that
these two problems have the same solution. Now, we need to prove that Z in problem (43) has at least
one zero eigenvalue, which means that Y in (40) has at least one zero eigenvalue as well. By exploiting
the following matrix rank property [54]:
rank(A−B) ≥ rank(A)− rank(B), (44)
we have
rank(Z) = rank
(
B− α1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s
)
≥ rank(B)− rank
(
α1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s
)
, (45)
where
B = I +
α12
R
σ2e
heh
H
e (46)
From (45), one can observe that rank(Z) is either NT or NT − 1. If rank(Z) = NT , it leads to Qs = 0,
which violates R > 0. Thus, we can claim rank(Z) = NT − 1, which means that Z has at least one zero
eigenvalue. Similarly, Y has at least one zero eigenvalue as well. On the other hand, the solution of α
can be the maximum value that satisfies the positive semidefinite constraint in (40), which leads to
αopt =
1
%max(
1
σ¯2s
hshHs − 2Rσ¯2e hehHe )
. (47)
The problem (37) can be formulated as a convex optimization problem. Hence, the strong duality holds
between the original problem (37) and the corresponding dual problem (40). The required minimum power
to achieve the secrecy rate constraint is
P opt = αopt(2R − 1). (48)
On the other hand, it is easily verified that the optimal w lies in the null space of Y
w¯ = vmax
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
, vopt =
w¯
‖w¯‖2 . (49)
Hence, the optimal solution to (37) can be expressed as
wopt =
√
P optvopt. (50)
B. Proof of Lemma 3
We first derive the first-order derivatives of (29), which is written as
∂UM(λ)
∂λ
=
1
ln 2
[
µ(1− θ)tsCM
1 + (λCM − 2DM)ts −
µ(1− θ)teCM
1 + (λCM − 2DM)te
]
− 2CMλ+ 2DM . (51)
Then, the second-order derivatives of (29) is given by
∂2UM(λ)
∂2λ
=
1
ln 2
[
µ(1− θ)C2M(t2e − t2s)
[1− (λCM − 2DM)ts]2[1− (λCM − 2DM)te]2
]
− 2CM < 0. (52)
The above inequality holds since ts− te > 0 to guarantee the minimum achievable secrecy rate is greater
than zero. Thus, (29) is a concave function.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
In order to show that (34) is a convex problem, which means that we only need to show UM is a
concave function with respect to θ. First, we rewrite UM as follows:
UM = µ(1− θ) log
(
1− θ + θt¯s
1− θ + θt¯e
)
− θΨ. (53)
It is easily observed that the concavity of (53) is only dependent on its first term due to the linear form
of its second term. Thus, let us define
fM = µ(1− θ) log
(
1−θ+θt¯s
1−θ
1−θ+θt¯e
1−θ
)
= µ(1− θ) log
(
θ(t¯s−1)+(1−t¯s)+t¯s
1−θ
θ(t¯e−1)+(1−t¯e)+t¯e
1−θ
)
= µ(1− θ) log
(
(1−t¯s)(1−θ)+t¯s
1−θ
(1−t¯e)(1−θ)+t¯e
1−θ
)
. (54)
The remaining part is to focus on the concavity of fM . Let z = 1− θ, (0 < θ < 1), fM can be rewritten
as
fM(z) = µz log
(1− t¯s)z + t¯s
z
− µz log (1− t¯e)z + t¯e
z
. (55)
Then, we consider the first derivative of fM ,
∂fM
∂z
=
µ
ln 2
[(
ln
(1− t¯s)z + t¯s
z
+
−t¯s
(1− t¯s)z + t¯s
)
−
(
ln
(1− t¯e)z + t¯e
z
+
−t¯e
(1− t¯e)z + t¯e
)]
. (56)
Furthermore, the second derivative of fM is given by
∂2fM
∂z2
=
µ
ln 2
[ −t¯2s
[(1− t¯s)z + t¯s]2z −
−t¯2e
[(1− t¯e)z + t¯e]2z
]
. (57)
Let g(t) = −t
2
[(1−t)z+t]2z , t > 0 the first derivative of g(t) is given by
∂g(t)
∂t
=
−2t[(1− t)z + t] + 2(1− z)t2
[(1− t)z + t]3z =
−2t
[z + (1− z)t]3 < 0. (58)
It is easily verified that (58) holds since z = 1 − θ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, g(t) is a monotonically decreasing
function of t. Due to t¯s > t¯e > 0, it is easily obtained that
∂2fM (z)
∂z2
< 0. In other words, fM(θ) is a
concave function with respect to θ. Thus, UM is also a concave function with respect to θ.
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